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Abstract 
Everyone agrees that joint attention is a key feature of human social cognition. Yet, despite over 
40 years of work and hundreds of publications on this topic, there is still surprisingly little 
agreement on what exactly joint attention is, and how the jointness in it is achieved. Part of the 
problem, we propose, is that joint attention is not a single process, but rather it includes a cluster 
of different cognitive skills and processes, and different researchers focus on different aspects of 
it. A similar problem applies to common knowledge. Here we present a new approach: We 
outline a typology of social attention levels which are currently all referred to in the literature as 
joint attention (from monitoring to common, mutual, and shared attention), along with 
corresponding levels of common knowledge. We consider cognitive, behavioral, and 
phenomenological aspects of the different levels as well as their different functions, and a key 
distinction we make in all of this is second-personal vs. third-personal relations. While we focus 
mainly on joint attention and common knowledge, we also briefly discuss how these levels might 
apply to other ‘joint’ mental states such as joint goals.   
 
Keywords: joint attention, common knowledge, second-person relations, communication, joint 
action, commitments  
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A New Look at Joint Attention and Common Knowledge 
 
1. Introduction 
From infancy through adulthood, joint attention is one of the most important skills in 
human social cognition. In joint attention we focus on things together with others (Mundy, 
Sullivan, & Mastergeorge, 2009). Thus, joint attention allows us to share experiences about the 
world with others, to coordinate our thoughts and behaviors, and to cooperate successfully with 
others (Tomasello, 1999; Trevarthen, 1979). It provides a foundation for early language 
development and social competence and facilitates social learning (Mundy, 2003). Individuals 
who lack the skills to follow and share attention with others have significant difficulties in 
relating to other people and sustaining relationships (Mundy & Newell, 2007). 
Despite universal agreement about the importance of joint attention, however, there is 
still surprisingly little agreement on exactly what joint attention is and how it is achieved. Even 
now, more than 40 years after the first articles on joint attention were published (Bruner, 1974; 
Lewis, 1969; Scaife & Bruner, 1975), there is much variability in how different researchers 
define and use the term joint attention. For example, some focus mainly on behaviors and define 
joint attention simply as “looking where someone else is looking” (Butterworth, 1995, p. 29). 
Others go further and define it as “the intentional co-orientation of two or more organisms to the 
same locus” (Leavens & Racine, 2009, p. 241). Others bring in the idea of interest, defining joint 
attention as “the ability to coordinate attention toward a social partner and an object of mutual 
interest” (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984, p. 1278; see also Baron-Cohen, 1989; Camaioni, 1993; 
Mundy & Newell, 2007). Still others go further, considering what kind of awareness the 
individuals must have and arguing that to be in joint attention, the individuals must know 
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together that they are attending to the same thing: They must have common knowledge of this 
(e.g., Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; R. P. Hobson, 2005; Tomasello, 1995). On the surface, these 
definitions may all sound similar – they all involve two individuals attending to the same thing – 
but actually, as we will see, there are important differences among them; differences which may 
account for many misunderstandings and unnecessary debates in the literature (Carpenter & Call, 
2013).  
A related long-standing debate concerns how the jointness and common knowledge in 
joint attention (and joint action) are achieved. Common knowledge was initially formally 
characterized as an infinite iteration of knowledge states such as “I know that you know, you 
know that I know that you know, I know that you know that I know that you know”, etc., ad 
infinitum (e.g., Lewis, 1969; Schiffer, 1972). There are definitional and terminological issues 
here as well: Some authors use the term “common knowledge” (Lewis, 1969) and others use the 
term “mutual knowledge” (Pinker, 2007; Schiffer, 1972) to describe this phenomenon, whereas 
others reserve “mutual knowledge” for the state in which you know X and I know X, but nothing 
else (Vanderschraaf & Sillari, 2014). Still others use “common knowledge” and “mutual 
knowledge” interchangeably (e.g., Clark, 1992, 1996). Regardless of which term is used, the 
formal characterization does not explain the psychological processes involved (Lewis, 1969). 
There is little agreement about how, psychologically speaking, we can know something together 
with someone else. Some authors have proposed that individuals infer common knowledge 
through a finite number of recursive steps (e.g., three to five, Bach & Hamish, 1979; Harder & 
Kock, 1976). In some of his writings, Tomasello (e.g., 2008, 2011) takes a modified version of 
this approach, claiming that some type of recursive mind-reading is involved in joint attention, 
even in infants. However, others have pointed out that the processing demands for even just a 
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few steps of recursive thinking are high, thus casting serious doubt on whether this can be how 
we – even as adults – achieve common knowledge instantaneously and effortlessly in most 
everyday circumstances (e.g., Clark & Marshall, 1981; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). Clark (1992) 
has suggested that we represent common knowledge as a ‘single mental entity’, e.g., “You and I 
mutually know X”. Similarly, Pinker (2007) proposed that we employ a simplified recursive 
formula, such as Y: “You and I know X, and you and I know Y”, where Y is both the entire 
formula and part of it.  
More recently, there is growing momentum in the idea that there is a crucial difference 
between the social-cognitive processes that take place when we act as detached observers of 
others (adopting a third-person perspective) versus when we directly engage in interaction with 
them (adopting a second-person perspective). It has been claimed that the primary way of 
understanding others is not through observing but rather through interacting and experiencing 
with them; consequently, there are calls to increase scientific attention to second-person 
engagement (e.g., DeJaegher, DiPaolo, & Gallagher, 2010; Gallotti & Frith, 2013; Heal, 2005; 
Michael, 2011; Reddy & Morris, 2004; Reddy, 1996; Schilbach, 2010; Schilbach et al., 2013; 
Zahavi, 2008, 2011). Regarding joint attention more specifically, it has been suggested that a 
second-person relation between individuals (Eilan, submitted; Gómez, 2005) and intersubjective 
engagement (R. P. Hobson, 2005; Reddy, 2011) are necessary conditions for joint attention. 
These ideas have direct implications for how the jointness and common knowledge in joint 
attention (and joint action) could be achieved.  
Therefore, here we develop these ideas further by taking a new look at joint attention and 
common knowledge and systematically distinguishing several closely related but clearly distinct 
phenomena within them. We begin by outlining a typology of different social attention levels, 
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which are all currently referred to in the literature as joint attention. We call them ‘social 
attention’ because all levels include consideration of another person’s attention; thus all levels 
depict some form of triadic relation between self, other, and an object of their attention. Along 
with these levels, we propose corresponding distinctions for the social knowledge states that are 
involved in these attention levels. We then introduce the idea that the social attention and 
knowledge levels exist on a ‘scale of jointness’ (i.e., in terms of how much the other is in mind, 
the certainty of jointness, and the felt connection with others), and describe several factors (e.g., 
goals, saliency, timing and contingency, behaviors) that can cause shifts in this scale. Next, we 
discuss the complexity of social attention and some of the different functions of these levels 
(supporting coordination, heightening and creating obligations, social bonding). Finally, we 
suggest directions for future studies: We briefly sketch how the levels map onto the available 
findings in human infants and children, animals, and social robots, to highlight gaps in our 
knowledge, and show how the typology can be applied to other joint mental states. 
2. A typology of social attention and social knowledge   
First, a few general notes. Although the literature on joint attention has primarily focused 
on the visual modality, note that each of these levels can apply to all types of external sensory 
inputs (visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, and gustatory e.g., Bigelow, 2003); that is, not only 
can we look at something together, we can also, for example, listen to or smell something 
together. Moreover, objects of social attention can be present, past, future, or imaginary events 
and states (including the lack of something); the self or the other (Reddy, 2003); and even mental 
states such as thoughts, beliefs, ideas, plans, etc. (For example, two people are discussing their 
plan to go for a picnic. During their discussion they are attending not to a physical object but to 
the idea of going for a picnic; O’Madagain & Tomasello, in press.) In addition, social attention 
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can come about through both bottom-up processes (i.e., through automatic, reflexive shifts of 
attention to a salient stimulus) and top-down processes (i.e., in an active, goal-directed way; 
Brinck, 2004; Kaplan & Hafner, 2006). Finally, for the sake of simplicity, most of the time we 
talk about two individuals, but of course more individuals can engage in each level as well. We 
use examples involving humans, but our framework does not presuppose that only humans are 
able to engage in these levels (see below for more on this).  
In what follows, we define four levels of social attention (monitoring, common, mutual, 
and shared). We categorize the levels according to the participants’ perspective (i.e., detached, 
third-person perspective vs. engaged second-person perspective), the type of knowledge they 
have when they are in these attentional states (individual vs. ‘common knowledge’ of different 
types), the participants’ dependency on each other (independence vs. interdependence), and the 
kind of experience the participants have (individual vs. co-created), and we discuss some of the 
behaviors involved in each level. Above we used the term ‘common knowledge’ broadly, as it is 
currently used in the literature, to refer generally to states that involve ‘knowing together’, as it is 
a well-established term. However, in what follows, we further distinguish common, mutual, and 
shared knowledge to refer to the specific knowledge states associated with the corresponding 
attention levels.  
A necessary pre-condition for each of the four social attention levels is that one is able to 
engage in individual attention. Individual attention simply means attending to something while 
engaging with the environment from a first-person perspective only. The attender is completely 
independent of others (no others need even be around), she has individual knowledge about the 
object of attention, and she does not take the perspective of anyone else present or change or 
connect with their attention state.  
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2.1. Monitoring attention 
An individual is monitoring attention when she takes a third-person, observer’s 
perspective on a second individual, and attends to what the other is attending to. 
Example 1: On an airplane, Allison notices that Rob, who is sitting next to her, suddenly 
moves his head closer to the airplane window and looks out. Allison follows Rob’s gaze and sees 
another airplane passing by and, at the same time, knows that Rob sees the airplane as well. 
Example 2: Annie is attending an anti-government demonstration. Suddenly, the sound of a loud 
siren fills the area. To protect her hearing, Annie covers her ears with her hands. A stranger, 
Alvy, stands in front of Annie with his back turned to her. Annie sees that Alvy also covers his 
ears when the siren starts. Annie is paying attention to the siren and, at the same time, focuses on 
the fact that Alvy is paying attention to the siren as well. Annie has individual knowledge about 
the siren and about the fact that Alvy perceives the siren as well. Her attention level is 
independent of that of Alvy in the sense that she can engage in this level separately, without 
Alvy’s active contribution or even awareness that she is there. Annie is having an individual 
experience. In this level, individuals do not have to be in the same level (as they do in the 
common, mutual, and shared levels below). Here, Annie is monitoring attention and Alvy is in 
individual attention. However, note that even when both individuals are monitoring each other’s 
attention to the object simultaneously, each just assesses the attention and knowledge state of the 
other individually, so both their experience and their knowledge remain individual. Often, 
monitoring attention results in an observable change in the monitor’s behavior (e.g., turning 
one’s gaze, head, and/or body orientation to look at what the other is looking at), but it is also 
possible to monitor someone’s attention covertly, without producing any easily observable 
behaviors. 
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One can go beyond monitoring another’s attention and additionally manipulate it. An 
individual is manipulating attention when she takes a third-person, observer’s perspective on a 
second individual, monitors the other’s attention, and then acts in such a way as to get the other 
to attend to something else. Like monitoring attention, manipulating attention involves individual 
knowledge and experience and can be independent of the other in the sense that we can 
manipulate others’ attention without even being there (e.g., if we leave something out in a 
conspicuous place for them to see when they get home).  
One can intentionally manipulate another’s attention in several ways. First, one can 
increase the saliency of events such that they capture the other’s attention. For example, if a 
guest at a dinner party does not want to ask directly for more wine, she can surreptitiously move 
her empty glass into the host’s visual field so the host will likely notice it and refill it (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1986). This requires monitoring what the host can/will be able to see. Second, one can 
directly manipulate someone else’s attention via a sort of unidirectional communication. The 
goal of unidirectional communication is only to convey information (e.g., there is something 
over there) from one individual to another, not to create a common focus of attention (in contrast 
to the bidirectional communication that takes place in the shared attention level below). Gestures 
such as pointing can be used to direct someone’s attention in this way. For instance, when the 
siren starts, Annie turns to Alvy, points ambiguously to the side while shouting, “The police are 
coming, look!” Alvy searches for the police. Annie uses the moment of distraction to steal 
Alvy’s bag and run away.  
 
In contrast to the monitoring attention level, which involves individual knowledge and 
experience, some type of ‘common knowledge’ (again in the broad sense of the term) about the 
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focus of the individuals’ attention is an integral part of each of the next three (common, mutual, 
and shared) levels. That is, in each of the next levels, it is necessary that both individuals are in 
the same level in order to achieve these levels. 
2.2. Common attention 
Two individuals are in common attention when they each take a third-person, observer’s 
perspective on the other, more or less simultaneously attend to what the other is attending to, and 
infer not only that they are both attending to the same thing, but also that they are attending to 
each other’s attention to the thing. Analogously to the classic definition of common knowledge 
discussed above, this characterization lays out what is needed to achieve common attention 
without committing to the specific psychological processes involved (see also Geurts, in press).  
That is, depending on the situation, individuals might engage in higher-order recursive reasoning 
(up to varying numbers of orders) or use various shortcuts to infer common knowledge (e.g., 
Clark, 1992; Pinker, 2007). The key point here is that this is done from a third-person, observer’s 
perspective and that both individuals believe that they are in common attention. 
Individuals can engage in common attention when 1) the object of attention is salient or 
public (so they can each assume that they are attending to the same thing), 2) for each of them 
the other’s attention is relevant for them (so they each have a reason to consider the other’s 
attention, for example they are in close physical proximity, or they have a previously-established 
joint goal, or they want to predict each other’s actions), and 3) they each know that their own 
attention is relevant and salient to the other. Under these conditions, individuals could know that 
they are attending to each other’s attention without any contact or communication.  
Example 1: Suddenly, the lights go off in the plane and Allison and Rob find themselves 
in darkness. Allison is attending to the fact that it is dark, to the fact that Rob must also be 
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perceiving the darkness, and to the fact that each knows that they each know this, and Rob is 
engaging in the same attentional processes. Example 2: Alvy stands next to Annie, so they are 
aware of each other’s presence. Annie is attending to the siren, to the fact that Alvy is attending 
to the siren, and to the fact that each knows that they each know this since the siren is so loud 
that it is clear that everyone in the vicinity must be hearing it. Alvy is engaging in the same 
attentional processes. Annie and Alvy have common knowledge about the siren achieved via 
recursive assumptions, inferences, and perspective-taking, since there are no specific external 
behaviors (beyond monitoring attention) associated with this level. Their attention level is 
dependent on that of the other in the sense that, from a bird’s-eye perspective, both of them must 
be attending to each other’s attention to the thing and each other to achieve this level. That is, the 
dependency is in their awareness that they are both engaging in the same attention processes. 
From each individual’s perspective, however, each evaluates separately whether they are in 
common attention and each might be mistaken about it (e.g., one believes that they are in 
common attention but later finds out that they were not). Therefore, Annie’s and Alvy’s 
experience, when reasoning about each other’s attention, is individual.  
2.3. The question of jointness 
This last point is key in separating the common attention level from the next two (mutual 
and shared) levels. According to one of the richest definitions of joint attention, individuals must 
know together that they are attending to the same thing (Tomasello, 1995). It might seem that 
already in common attention Annie and Alvy are attending together to the loud siren, because 
they have common knowledge about it. However, we would argue that they are not truly 
attending with each other yet, as they have not yet made ‘attention contact’ with each other 
(Gómez, 1996), actively shared the information in any way yet (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011), or in 
A new look at joint attention  12 
 
Taylor's (1985) terms, they have not yet put it out there ‘between us’ as something to focus on 
together. Because in the common attention example Annie stands in a third-person relation to 
Alvy at this moment, she must infer and assess Alvy’s knowledge. Using either the classic 
recursive approach (s/he knows that I know that s/he knows…) or some simpler version of it 
(Clark, 1992; Pinker, 2007), they can each know that they each know about the siren and each 
other’s knowledge of both it and their own knowledge, and thus can achieve a type of ‘common 
knowledge’ (broadly speaking). However, this level of attention and knowledge does not seem to 
be known truly together in any meaningful way. In contrast to the ‘meeting of minds’ that takes 
place in the classic ‘joint attentional triangle’, it is basically two individual perspectives that 
never meet in the middle: Each individual just assesses the attention and knowledge states of the 
other individually (Calabi, 2008; Carpenter & Liebal, 2011).  
Although fairly complex processes including recursive assumptions, inferences, and 
perspective-taking can be used both in third-person as well as in second-person relations, in 
second-person relations, engagement can allow for a different, more direct and non-inferential 
processing of the situation, which is not possible outside of this type of relation (Gómez, 2005; 
Reddy, 1996). Thus the proposal is that we should reserve the terms ‘mutual’ and ‘shared’ for 
interactions that involve this second-personal relation – where it is really done together (Eilan, 
submitted; Gómez, 2005; Reddy, 1996, 2011; Zahavi, 2015).  
In a second-person relation, one no longer has a detached, observer’s attitude toward the 
other and his or her attention; the other is not perceived as ‘he’ or ‘she’ (Reddy & Morris, 2004). 
Instead, both individuals are in direct engagement with each other and treating each other as 
‘you’, and both are senders and receivers of information at the same time (Argyle & Cook, 1976; 
Zahavi, 2015). Direct social interactions provide both partners with a wealth of cues about what 
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is relevant and salient, and where each other’s attention is focused. Importantly, each partner 
becomes a “constituent part” of the other’s experience (Campbell, 2005; Zahavi, 2015). That is, 
their perspectives and attention to the object of attention are colored by their mutual awareness 
of each other’s attention, and the experience differs qualitatively from the situation in which the 
individuals attend to the same thing but are not relating as ‘you’ to each other (as in the 
monitoring and common attention levels above).  
Although second-person engagement is typically described as being an extremely rich 
and in-depth intersubjective experience, actually it comes in degrees. Even within an 
interactional context, we can take different approaches towards the other (i.e., instrumental, 
detached, and objectified vs. engaged, involved, and attuned) – not all interactions involve 
mutual engagement (e.g., Buber, 1958; Fuchs, 2012, Reddy, 2018; Schilbach et al., 2013). We 
will thus use the term second-person relation to refer to situations in which individuals adopt an 
engaged approach towards each other in an interactional context. Both the intensity of interactive 
exchanges and participants’ approach influence the richness of a second-person relation. A 
prolonged, face-to-face conversation between two close friends represents a rich version of this, 
but even a brief encounter between two strangers making eye contact can establish a second-
person relation, although a very minimal one, as it already allows for bidirectional contact and 
signals openness for engagement (in contrast we skillfully avoid eye contact when no 
engagement is desired.)  
This is the crucial difference that we would like to highlight as we think about the 
difference between the previous levels and the next two: The previous levels have an 
individualistic nature; the next levels, mutual and shared attention, are bidirectional and 
relational. The main difference between the next two levels lies in the presence or absence of 
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intentional bidirectional communicative exchange about the object of attention.   
2.4. Mutual attention 
Two individuals are in mutual attention when they are engaged in a second-person 
relation to each other, while they are more or less simultaneously attending to the same thing, 
such that both of them directly experience each other attending both to that thing and to their 
own attention to the thing and each other. Thus, mutual attention involves both individuals being 
aware – in a second-person relation to each other, but without intentional communication – that 
they are attending to the same thing with each other. Most prototypically, the individuals make 
eye contact about the thing. When their eyes meet, both know that they are attending to each 
other and ‘attention contact’ is established (Gómez, 1996). When the thing in the environment is 
salient and/or relevant for both individuals, eye contact enables them to gain reciprocal and 
reactive information about their attention to it. Another example of such bidirectional behavior is 
mutual touch (Botero, 2016) (e.g., squeezing hands). 
Example 1: When the lights go off in the plane, Allison and Rob grasp each other’s hand 
reflexively. Example 2: When the siren first starts, Annie looks around to see what is happening. 
So does Alvy, and their eyes meet. As their eyes meet, it is mutually manifested that they are 
both attending to the siren and thus they both know that they both know this. Annie and Alvy 
have mutual knowledge about the siren achieved via experiencing it with each other. Their 
attention level is dependent on that of the other in the sense that both of them must engage in 
these attentional processes together in order to achieve this level. Their experience is 
qualitatively different from the individual experiences in the previous levels; they co-create their 
experience and it is colored by their direct mutual awareness of each other’s attention. Even 
though the eye contact signals to both individuals that the contact was established, in mutual 
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attention neither of the individuals intentionally communicates about the object of their attention. 
2.5. Shared attention 
Two individuals are in shared attention when on top of an interaction that meets the 
criteria for mutual attention, in addition they intentionally communicate with each other about 
the object of their attention, and/or the fact that they are sharing attention to it. In contrast to 
mutual attention, which apparently typically comes about incidentally (e.g., via incidental eye 
contact), the state of shared attention is achieved intentionally and can often be an end in itself 
(Gómez, Sarriá, & Tamarit, 1993). 
Example 1: Rob sees the other airplane passing by in the distance. He points out the 
window for his son sitting next to him, waits until his son looks out at the airplane, and then they 
engage in eye contact and start talking about the plane. Example 2: When the siren sounds, as 
Annie starts looking around to see what is happening, so does Alvy, and their eyes meet. As their 
eyes meet, Annie raises her eyebrows questioningly, and Alvy responds with a concerned look. 
From the communication inherent in shared attention, Annie and Alvy gain several layers of 
shared knowledge about the siren (see below). Annie and Alvy’s attention level is dependent on 
that of each other in the sense that both must engage in these attentional processes in order to 
achieve this level. Again, they co-create their experience, but the experience is different from 
mutual attention as the communicative exchange allows them to actively align psychological 
states such as attitudes, emotions, and goals about the object of attention with each other.  
In the shared attention level, individuals follow and direct others’ attention, but in 
contrast to the corresponding but third-person monitoring and manipulating attention above, the 
goal here is to create a bidirectionally-shared focus of attention (Gilbert, 2007). Often, in the top-
down case, one partner intentionally directs another’s attention to something they can focus on 
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together using behaviors that are intentionally communicative, checks that the other has 
perceived it, and the other partner confirms, communicatively, that attention is shared. Shared 
attention is thus characterized by behaviors in which individuals confirm to each other that they 
are attending to the same thing. The communication need not be verbal (although often it is, e.g., 
“Look!”); it could also, or in addition, simply involve ‘communicative’ or ‘sharing’ looks (e.g., 
Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; J. A. Hobson & R. P. Hobson, 2007), that is, looks that express some 
message. Other prototypical examples of nonverbal behaviors are declarative gestures such as 
pointing and showing. This confirmation is present in the bottom-up case as well. When a 
stimulus is salient, partners first automatically shift their attention to it, and then they confirm 
verbally (e.g., “That was loud!”) or nonverbally (e.g., eye contact with nodding or smiling) that 
they are sharing attention (Brinck, 2004; Kaplan & Hafner, 2006). 
Several layers of messages can be communicated in shared attention, which add to the 
layers of shared knowledge that can be gained. Not only do the partners have shared knowledge 
about the object of attention (the main referent or topic of their communication, e.g., we hear the 
siren), they also have shared knowledge about the communication itself (e.g., we intentionally 
communicated about our attention to the siren). In addition, partners also typically convey an 
attitude or comment about the object of attention (Bruner, 1974; Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; e.g., 
we are concerned about the situation), so they have shared knowledge about this as well. 
Sometimes they may even comment on the fact that attention is shared, or “share the experience 
of sharing” (R. P. Hobson & J. A. Hobson, 2008, p. 79), for example when an infant and her 
mother look at each other with a smile while playing, for no other reason than to express pleasure 
about their shared activity. The communication inherent in this level means that all of these 
things are out in the open, public, and, to some extent, undeniable (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011). 
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All of these layers create more specific shared common ground about the object of attention, the 
partners’ attitudes about it, and their shared experience, and contribute to building up the 
partners’ conversational record (Lewis, 1979).   
 
To summarize, here we have offered a new typology of different social attention and 
corresponding social knowledge levels, highlighting the difference between third-person and 
second-person relations. In contrast to the way in which the term joint attention has previously 
been used quite broadly in the literature, we suggest that we are only jointly attending to 
something with someone when we are in a direct, reciprocal, and engaged second-person 
relation with them. The most prototypical case of this is the shared attention level; the minimal 
version is the mutual attention level. The levels have a cumulative structure in terms of the layers 
of knowledge involved. Using the siren example above:  
i) In all four social levels, I know that I hear the siren and that you hear the siren. 
ii) In the common, mutual, and shared levels, additionally, I know that each of us knows 
that each of us hears the siren and that we each know that we each know all this about 
each other. 
iii) In the mutual and shared levels, additionally, I know that we are both experiencing 
together our hearing the siren and both know this.  
iv) In the shared level, additionally, we both know that we communicated to each other 
about the siren and thus that we have confirmed to each other that we hear the siren 
together. 
See Figure 1 for a schematic depiction of each level, and Table 1 for a summary of some 
of the characteristics of each level.  
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Figure 1. The figure is from the perspective of target individual A only. B is a second individual. 
X is the object of attention. Arrows represent what A and B are attending to. In individual 
attention, A attends to X and B. In monitoring attention, A attends to B’s attention to X. In 
common attention, A attends to B’s attention to X and herself. In mutual attention, A’s attention 
to B’s attention to X and herself is depicted via the solid two-way arrow, which represents non-
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communicative eye contact. In shared attention, the special two-way arrow represents 
communicative eye contact (and/or other bidirectional communication). Thought bubbles 
represent what A has in mind (this figure depicts a visual example).  
 
 
Table 1.   
Characteristics of the different attention levels. The same characteristic across levels is marked by the same color.  
 
Individual Monitoring Common Mutual Shared 
Type of perspective First person Third person Third person Second person Second person 
Description of the experience I attend to X 
He/she attends to 
X 
He/she attends to X 
and to my attention to 
X and himself/herself 
You and I (we) 
attend to X 
You and I (we)  
attend to X and 
are actively 
communicating 
about this 
Type of interaction 
Dyadic (i.e., 
subject and 
object) 
Triadic Triadic Triadic Triadic 
Knowledge gained 
Individual 
knowledge 
Individual 
knowledge 
Common knowledge Mutual knowledge 
Shared 
knowledge 
Does the second individual know that the 
first is in that level of attention? 
Not necessarily Not necessarily Yes Yes Yes 
“Intimate I+you we feeling”1 No No No Yes Yes, stronger 
Commitments and obligations No No 
Yes (but plausible 
deniability is 
possible) 
Yes (but some 
plausible deniability 
is still possible) 
Yes  
                                                 
 
1 There are several types of “we feeling” (Zahavi, 2015). Here we distinguish a) the intimate/private/personal we feeling arising from a bidirectional, direct 
connection with others (this we feeling is subjectively strong) and b) the associative we feeling arising from association with others, arising because individuals 
have something in common (e.g., they both are attending to the same thing; this feeling comes from knowing rather than experiencing). It is interesting to note 
here that while in mutual and shared attention, almost by definition you know exactly who you are attending with, in common attention this does not need to be 
the case.  For example, I can know that everyone (with normal hearing) within a certain radius must have heard the noise of a loud explosion, without knowing 
exactly who those people are. 
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3. A scale of jointness  
In the literature, joint attention is discussed as a binary, discrete, and uniform event: 
Either social partners are in joint attention or they are not, and when they are, they are in it in an 
all-or-nothing way. However, we argue that in actual fact, there is much more complexity to 
social attention, and that jointness comes in degrees. This is the case both when comparing 
different levels and when considering the jointness within each level. There are various things 
that make situations feel more or less joint. Aspects of jointness include (but are not limited to) 
the perceived psychological closeness between the individuals, how much the other is in mind, 
the connection felt (the ‘we feeling’; Zahavi, 2015), and the certainty about the object of 
attention and/or that attention is joint (see below for more on this latter point). That is, first, the 
social attention levels exist on a scale of jointness (see Figure 2), with monitoring attention (in 
which we have an individual experience of the other’s attention) on the left side, representing no 
jointness, and shared attention (in which we truly attend to something together with the other) on 
the right side, representing the highest degree of jointness. Second, it is important to note that 
although for the sake of simplicity we provided prototypical examples for each level above, in 
reality there exist stronger and weaker examples in each level, that is, that there is a continuum 
within each level too. Consider the siren example in the mutual attention level. This situation 
could range from accidental eye contact (while Annie and Alvy are instinctively looking around), 
to more intentional eye contact (e.g., Annie and Alvy each look at each other to check if the 
other hears the siren too, and they happen to do this at the same time), to eye contact with mutual 
reactiveness (during the eye contact Annie and Alvy both reflexively cover their ears). These 
examples lie to the left, middle, and right side of the scale in the mutual attention level, 
respectively.  
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Figure 2. A scale of jointness. 
 
3.1. Factors that can cause shifts in the scale of jointness  
There are a variety of factors that can make it more likely that we move along the scale, 
both along the different levels of the scale and within each level: 
 Saliency: Salient stimuli generally push situations to the right on the scale of jointness. It 
is easier for individuals to establish all of these types of attention to very salient things 
(e.g., an elephant standing in the lobby of one’s office building) then to subtle things 
(e.g., a new vase standing in the lobby). However if a stimulus is too salient and 
attention-grabbing, we might focus solely on it and be stuck in individual attention (e.g., 
when a bomb explodes, we might at least initially just focus on ourselves and our own 
safety before thinking of anyone else). 
 Goals: The existence and strength of a relevant shared goal between the individuals, and 
their interest in it, pushes situations to the right on the scale of jointness. If Annie and 
Alvy had recently spent long hours planning how to avoid being arrested at the anti-
government demonstration, when the noise of the siren fills the area it is probable that 
they will be more on the right side of the scale compared to a situation in which they had 
not had a shared goal. 
Monitoring attention Mutual attention Shared attention Common attention 
Third-person perspective 
(individually attending to the same thing) 
Second-person relation 
(jointly attending to the same thing) 
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 Type of common ground2: Similarly, the strength and depth of the common ground the 
individuals have can push the situation to the right on the scale. Increasingly joint types 
of common ground generally range from no common ground, to common ground for 
rational beings, to cultural common ground, to common ground from co-presence, to 
personally-shared common ground (Clark, 1996; Clark & Marshall, 1981). Example: 
Robin and Max are waiting at a bus stop and suddenly a bomb explodes in front of them. 
Contrast the situation in which Max is the 2-year-old son of the woman standing next to 
Robin and the situation in which Max is an adult colleague who had just recently 
discussed with Robin a newspaper article saying that there is a security threat in their 
country (so, in addition to all the other types, they have personally-shared common 
ground). In the first case, after looking communicatively to each other, because they 
share little contextually-relevant common ground, Robin and Max are on the left side of 
the scale in shared attention about the fact that the bomb exploded. In contrast, in the 
second case, they have quite specific shared common ground that is relevant to the 
explosion, so they are on the right side of the shared attention continuum. On top of their 
shared attention about the bomb exploding, they are sharing a more complex and detailed 
message such as, “Oh, no, it is here! We talked about this yesterday.” Note that if we 
have very specific shared common ground (especially recently shared common ground) 
we can communicate much more complex messages with less obvious behaviors. For 
                                                 
 
2 Common ground suffers from terminological and conceptual confusion as well. In this paper we will use “common 
ground” as an umbrella term encompassing ‘common knowledge’ (in the broad sense of the term), beliefs, and 
assumptions coming from different sources (e.g., co-presence, joint personal experiences, cultural background, etc.; 
Clark, 1996). 
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example, if two employees have just been complaining about their boss, the briefest, most 
neutral and surreptitious glance between them during a meeting with her can convey a 
complex message (e.g., “See what I mean?”), especially if the look occurs contingently to 
something relevant that their boss just said.  
 Contingency and timing: As suggested above, strong contingency and/or a short time 
interval can push situations to the right on the scale (e.g., in the shared level, contingency 
and a short time interval between the appearance of the object of attention and the eye 
contact/communication, or between the formation or most recent discussion of a shared 
goal and the appearance of the object of attention). For example, in the siren example, 
consider the difference between cases in which Annie looks communicatively at Alvy 
immediately after the siren starts, 10 seconds later, or 10 minutes later. An immediate 
look would create a stronger feeling of jointness (lying more on the right side of the 
shared attention level) than a delayed look, and if they looked at each other 10 minutes 
later, it might not be at all clear what the other’s look was about. 
 Perceptual space: Perceptual space with clear borders (an office, a department’s mailing 
list) or small perceptual spaces (a car) push situations to the right on the scale (especially 
with regard to the certainty that we are attending to the same thing with someone) 
compared to perceptual spaces with vague borders (a university, Facebook) or huge 
perceptual spaces (a city, a concert hall).3 
 Behaviors: Observable behavior, ranging from unintentional or reflexive behaviors to 
                                                 
 
3 There is an interplay between the type of perceptual space and the type and saliency of the stimulus. For example, 
it is difficult to guess where the borders are for being able to perceive sound from an explosion, but it is easy to 
guess that the smell of freshly-made cookies in a room will not reach the space outside the room when the door and 
windows are closed. 
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verbal or otherwise explicit communication, pushes situations to the right on the scale. 
For example, when someone sneezes, it might send a signal to others that he can smell 
the pepper spilled on the table, or when someone gasps or sighs while watching a movie, 
it might send a signal to others that he was attending to something in the movie. And of 
course in the shared attention level, sharedness becomes more clear depending on the 
explicitness and ostensiveness of the communication. To illustrate, consider the example 
with the siren. As Annie’s and Alvy’s eyes meet, if they look silently at each other with 
communicative looks after the siren filled the area they would be more to the left of the 
continuum in the shared attention level than if Annie looked to Alvy and said, “Oh, this is 
bad!” and Alvy agreed.  
 Individual differences: People who tend to have others in mind more often or who have 
a higher motivation to share appear on the right side of the scale more often than people 
who do not. One reason for this is simply because they initiate shared attention more 
often. 
 Relationship closeness: People who are close to each other end up on the right side of 
the scale more often. There is a natural tendency to have close others in mind and share 
attention more with people who are close (family members, friends, partners). 
3.2. Certainty  
Two kinds of certainty are important when attending socially with someone: 1) certainty 
about the object of attention – how can we know with certainty that we are attending to the same 
thing as someone else? and 2) certainty that attention is joint – how can we know with certainty 
that we are attending to the same thing with someone else? Several ways of gathering 
information about other people’s attentional focus exist in different situations and influence our 
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certainty. Some require fewer assumptions than others, for example you can see your friend 
seeing X (gaze following), but you can also just hear (but not see) that your friend is co-present, 
or just assume that your friend is co-present, and therefore you can assume that your friend 
perceives X. Similarly, fewer assumptions are required when we can directly perceive X in the 
environment (e.g., we can see/smell/hear X) (perceptual attention) than when we must infer the 
relevant object of attention (conceptual attention, e.g., to absent referents, for instance, an infant 
pointing about a missing puzzle piece for her mother).  
When the stimulus is very salient, the certainty that you are attending to the same thing as 
someone else does not necessarily change with the different social attention levels. We are 
sensitive to perceptual co-presence with other people, and expect similar perceptual or 
attentional abilities from them, unless we learn otherwise (e.g., we find out that someone is 
visually- or hearing-impaired; Clark, 1996). Therefore, when the noise of a loud siren fills the 
area and you can hear it, you know that everyone else in the vicinity must be hearing it too.  
In contrast, being in the higher attention levels increases the certainty that we are 
attending to the same thing with someone. For example, imagine that you are sitting next to your 
friend in a train, and, in front of you, you see that, as soon as the woman sitting opposite you 
leaves for a moment, the man sitting next to her reaches into her purse and steals her wallet. 
Even before you and your friend engage in any behavior toward each other, you infer that the 
stealing is salient enough to grab the attention of your friend as well, and that your friend realizes 
the same about you, so you have common knowledge about the thief (common attention). 
However, your certainty that you are attending to this together increases considerably once you 
engage in eye contact after seeing it (mutual attention), and even more once you exchange 
concerned looks and/or discuss it (shared attention).  
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Note that it is often impossible to be 100% certain that you are attending to the same 
thing with someone. However, this is not a problem, as certainty is probabilistic. That is, you 
each believe that you are attending to the same thing together, and that the other believes this 
with some probability too. How high the probability needs to be depends on the current 
purposes. So although we use terms like ‘knowing together’ and common, mutual, and shared 
knowledge, more specifically we mean probabilistic knowledge/belief with sufficiently high 
probability for those purposes (Clark, 1996; Monderer & Samet, 1989). To illustrate: If you are 
considering confronting the thief together with your friend, certainty is important and thus you 
likely would not want to rely only on common attention, but instead would engage in shared 
attention. 
4. The complexity of social attention 
Joint attention is often discussed in the literature as an isolated, momentary occurrence, in 
which individuals attend to a single object or event. However, many everyday social attention 
episodes are much more complex. First, most of the levels (i.e., all except mutual attention) can 
be quite extended in time. For example, a spy could monitor the attention of someone all day, 
and we can be in common or shared attention with other audience members at a concert or movie 
for hours.  
Second, in any given situation, we can move from individual attention to any other level, 
or move among the different social levels, instantaneously. Sometimes one level might function 
as a precursor to another level (e.g., when you want to show a hot air balloon to your partner, 
you might first monitor your partner’s attention, to determine where your partner’s focus is, and 
then choose the best way to initiate attention sharing). Sometimes we can even engage in two or 
more levels simultaneously (e.g., if you and I are monitoring the attention of someone else 
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together, or when I take a third-person perspective on you during a second-person interaction, 
thinking, “Why is she looking at me that way?”; Reddy, 2018). This can result in a number of 
hierarchically-embedded states of attention occurring at the same time, either with the same or 
with different people. At a movie, for instance, I can simultaneously monitor the attention of a 
character on the screen, be in common attention with other audience members that the character 
is looking at something, and turn to share attention to the thing the character is looking at with 
my partner. Similarly, the whole ‘going to the movie’ experience is a shared attention episode 
with my partner, and there are numerous hierarchically-embedded, smaller shared or mutual 
attention episodes within that experience, when we, for example, agree that the popcorn is very 
salty, or squeeze each other’s hands reflexively at a scary moment, etc. Thus, although we 
mainly discuss the different social attention levels separately in order to highlight the important 
differences across them, we note that complex relations can also exist among and within them.  
Third, the attention levels take place live, in real time. When we exchange letters with 
someone, although this is reciprocal communication, it is not shared attention (though real-time, 
immediate texting, in contrast, may be). However, we do create shared knowledge and common 
ground from these types of exchanges. We can also engage in virtual sharing in which we just 
imagine sharing attention with someone, for example, when I celebrate my country’s team’s goal 
while watching the World Cup abroad and imagine my dad cheering ‘with’ me in our home 
country. Again this is not real shared attention; but it can result in an amplified experience and 
influence future interactions and bonding between individuals. Thus, direct, real-time experience 
of social attention has unique qualities that cannot fully be attained with experiences that are 
sequential or delayed in time or space.  
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5. Functions of the different levels 
It is useful to distinguish these levels for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, it 
should help in eliminating unnecessary confusion and debate in discussions about whether, for 
example, different animals can engage in joint attention (see below for our take on this). In 
addition, as we will discuss here, the different social attention levels serve different functions.  
Monitoring attention brings some advantages to individuals who are capable of it, over 
and above individual attention. First, it can be useful simply for gathering more information from 
the environment than one could on one’s own, for instance when as a result of monitoring 
someone else’s attention we discover something interesting or useful or dangerous that we might 
not have discovered on our own (e.g., Max is walking on a pier at a lake and he sees a couple in 
front of him excitedly peering into the water. He approaches to find out what they are looking at 
and sees an alligator swimming there). Second, monitoring attention is useful in making 
informed predictions about others’ future actions, so we can adjust our own actions accordingly. 
This is often useful in competitive situations, because then the information gathered can be used 
exploitatively to gain an advantage over others (Tomasello, 2008). But we can also monitor 
others’ attention in prosocial situations (e.g., Pam is in a store and sees an elderly woman 
looking up, fixating her gaze frustratedly on something on a high shelf. Pam determines that the 
woman is looking at a box of tea, and so approaches and gets the box for the woman). Similarly, 
we can manipulate the attention of others to things in the environment either to reach our own 
goals (e.g., to get someone to attend to something we need, for example, our wineglass that 
needs refilling; or by distracting their attention deceptively) or to help others to reach their goals 
(e.g., by redirecting their attention to something relevant for them).    
Common attention similarly helps us make informed predictions about others’ future 
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actions. However in common attention one can understand not only what someone else attends 
to/knows but also what the other attends to/knows about one’s own attention/knowledge, and this 
allows for a considerably more complex appraisal of the situation. This can be especially helpful 
in solving ‘coordination dilemmas’ – situations in which it is in our interest to decide what to do 
based on our expectation of how our social partner is likely to behave, and our partner’s decision 
likewise depends on what he or she expects from us (Clark, 1996; Chwe, 2013). For example, 
imagine that a group of protesters has agreed before going to a demonstration that, no matter 
where they are in the crowd, whenever they hear a siren, they will start shouting anti-police 
slogans. Although all the protesters want to participate as a group, no one wants to engage in this 
potentially dangerous act alone. When a siren sounds, the protesters’ ability to engage in 
common attention with their fellow protesters to the sound of the siren may give them 
confidence to make the risky decision to start shouting. Being able to engage in common 
attention enables us to coordinate even in cases in which we are apart and contact or 
communication is not possible. However, in the common attention level we can only coordinate 
attention towards salient or relevant things or events. If it is not clear that everyone can hear the 
siren, it would be more difficult or even impossible to engage in common attention with any 
certainty. 
In contrast to the individualistic nature of these two levels, in which we must examine the 
situation and consider our partner’s attentional state from the perspective of an outside observer, 
the direct nature of the attention contact in the mutual and especially shared attention levels, as 
well as the bidirectional, reciprocal evidence it provides about where each partner’s attention is 
focused, makes communication, interaction, coordination, and collaboration much more efficient 
and fluent. Another helpful function of shared attention is that it enables us to create a shared 
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focus even to subtle things in complex environments, which might not be perceived as salient 
and/or relevant for both of us at first. This is not only helpful in supporting conversations and 
joint action, but in learning and other contexts as well (e.g., for infant language acquisition).  
Another important function of the social attention levels is that some of them heighten or 
even create social obligations and commitments. For example, imagine that Jane slips on the wet 
floor and is having difficulty standing up again. A man is standing nearby. We all know that we 
should help others when we can, but sometimes we shirk our obligation to help. However, if 
Jane’s fall makes so much noise that she and the man both know that they both know about it, 
then this amplifies the already-existing obligation of the man to help Jane because they are in 
common attention about her need for help. If this turns into mutual attention, when Jane and the 
man make eye contact, this feeling of obligation becomes much more personal and directed, so 
the man might feel particularly obligated to help her. In this case, it would be difficult for the 
man to deny having seen Jane fall, because the same single event of making eye contact when 
seeing Jane’s fall also removed any doubt in the man’s mind that she saw him seeing her fall. 
Consequently, mutual attention can create some pressure to follow social norms in situations in 
which people need to decide whether to act in accordance with norms or not.4  
However, in addition to cuing or heightening existing obligations even more strongly, in 
the shared attention level, new obligations and even commitments can be created. The 
bidirectional communication in shared attention makes public the fact that attention is shared. 
We can refer to the instance of sharing afterwards and it is difficult to plausibly deny both the 
fact that attention was shared and any commitments or obligations following from this. This 
                                                 
 
4 We thank Sebastian Grueneisen (personal communication) for the examples highlighting how common, mutual, 
and shared knowledge heighten the pressure to follow social norms.  
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facilitates social coordination above and beyond common and mutual attention. For example, in 
the right context, shared attention in the form of communicative eye contact can lead not only to 
an expectation that one’s partner will cooperate, but even to the perception of a commitment on 
her part to cooperate (Siposova, Tomasello, & Carpenter, 2018). This perception of a 
commitment is so strong that it even engenders normative protests if the partner does not 
subsequently behave as expected. 
Social attention is not only useful, but it can be a source of pleasure for us as well. This is 
especially pronounced for the shared attention level. It feels good to connect with others and to 
engage in shared attention (Schachter, 1959); we often engage in shared attention just for the 
sake of the sharing itself (Gómez et al., 1993). Even as 1-year-old infants, we are so motivated to 
share attention with others that we will actually turn away from interesting sights to share them 
with others − the sharing is just as pleasurable (or even more so) than the sight itself. We have a 
feeling of ‘contact’ with the other, and consequently we may feel a “we feeling” which causes 
changes in our experience. In shared attention, we build our shared common ground. We know 
what objects and events we have shared, and can refer to them in the future. Sharing attention 
might also cause an increased sense of similarity (with all the benefits that that entails; Haun & 
Over, 2013), which may emerge because paying attention to the same things/events/ideas might 
lead to thinking that whoever is interested in the same things I am is probably like me. Similarly, 
both initiation of shared attention and responding to shared attention signal an interest in the 
other – an interest in exploring the world together. With shared attention we can also express 
trust, openness, and intimacy. There are individual differences in the ease with which we share 
attention with others. The closeness of our relationship with our partner may increase the 
probability of smooth, mistake-free episodes, and, in turn, successful episodes of shared attention 
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likely increase bonding (see also Wolf, Launay, & Dunbar, 2015). Thus, shared attention is 
important in forming attachments and sustaining positive interpersonal relationships. On the 
other hand, skilled deceivers can exploit this to create an illusion of openness and use shared 
attention behaviors for deception in competitive or deceptive situations (e.g., being sure to make 
eye contact when lying).  
6. Future directions 
The next important step in social attention research is to come up with operational 
definitions of these levels so it will be possible to determine which levels different types of 
individuals, such as young children, animals, and social robots, can achieve. As social attention 
states cannot typically be measured directly (except perhaps using neuroimaging techniques), it 
is challenging to find the best ways of investigating them.  
One approach is to look for specific behaviors. The question is which behavior(s) should 
be considered as indicative of each of the levels. We have described some behaviors that 
typically accompany the levels above. However, these particular behaviors might differ across 
species and are neither necessary nor sufficient for identifying any given level. For example, 
turning one’s head/gaze in the direction of someone else’s could be a result either of low-level 
spatial cuing or monitoring or following someone else’s attention. And a quick glance between 
partners could either be an accidental meeting of the eyes or sharing attention via communicative 
but neutral eye contact (e.g., in a situation, such as in a group meeting, in which the signaler does 
not wish anyone other than the recipient to be able to discern his meaning). It might thus be 
helpful to focus on behavioral sequences, instead of isolated behaviors. An example of this could 
be looking at partners’ interaction history: for example, what preceded the quick glance between 
them, whether the glance was contingent on something salient for them, and what behaviors 
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followed afterwards. However, quite often we do not have access to others’ interaction history or 
future interactions. And although useful, investigation only of observable behaviors without 
considering knowledge states cannot provide conclusive evidence about which levels different 
types of individuals can achieve. 
Experiments are helpful in this regard. For example, one approach is to design studies in 
such a way that participants can only succeed on the task if they are engaging in a certain 
attention and knowledge level, or to experimentally manipulate the level that the participants can 
be in. It could help, for example, to focus on individuals’ behavior in situations such as 
coordination dilemmas, in which their patterns of responses are predicted by their attention and 
knowledge states. For instance, in a Stag Hunt coordination game, in a common attention 
condition, no eye contact or communication with one’s partner could be possible, but the 
presence of the stag could be made salient and public in other ways, whereas in mutual and 
shared attention conditions, eye contact and/or communication could be possible (for an example 
of a similar approach, with different patterns of responses in different conditions, see Thomas, 
DeScioli, Haque, & Pinker, 2014). Another useful approach is to test whether participants can 
engage in a given level and include control conditions designed to rule out lower-level 
alternative explanations of participants’ behavior (see, e.g., studies on infants’ shared attention 
by Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004, and Moll, Richter, Carpenter, 
& Tomasello, 2008). Still another approach is to experimentally manipulate characteristic 
features of the different levels in order to empirically test claims about, for example, the role of 
communication in achieving shared attention (e.g., see Siposova et al., 2018, for an example of 
this approach).  
An important direction for future research is to determine which levels various types of 
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individuals show. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review this in depth, but next we sketch 
briefly how the proposed levels map onto the available findings in human children, animals, and 
social robots. Note that as previous studies were not designed to distinguish among these levels, 
at this point it is not always possible to make firm conclusions about which levels different 
individuals can achieve.  
6.1. Which attention levels can different types of individuals achieve? 
6.1.1. Human infants and children  
A pre-condition for each of the four social attention levels is some understanding of 
attention, or at least perception. For example, minimally, it is necessary that individuals 
understand that when others are ‘looking at something,’ they are ‘seeing something.’ It has been 
proposed that already in their first months infants demonstrate an awareness of others’ attention 
by producing emotional reactions when experiencing others’ attention to themselves (Reddy, 
2003), and by decreasing smiling after interrupted eye contact at the age of 3 months (Hains & 
Muir, 1996). Even newborns look preferentially at faces with direct gaze (Farroni, Csibra, 
Simion, & Johnson, 2002) and perceived gaze shifts trigger corresponding gaze shifts in 3-
month-olds (Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998). However, it is not clear how much infants 
understand about others’ attention at these young ages. It becomes clearer around 12 months of 
age that infants do have some understanding of others as capable of attending to things, when 
they follow the gaze of others to things that they cannot see themselves, for example around 
visual barriers and even to things behind them (e.g., Deák et al., 2000; Moll & Tomasello, 2004).  
Although we presented the levels in the order monitoring, common, mutual, and shared 
attention (representing the degree of jointness involved), interestingly, this does not necessarily 
correspond with the order in which these levels emerge in human development. In fact, it appears 
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that the latter two levels are seen earliest in development. Most researchers agree that joint 
attention develops between 9-12 months of age; however others have claimed that the beginnings 
of joint attention actually are seen well before this. For example, Rossmanith, Costall, Reichelt, 
López,  and Reddy (2014) have suggested that during a picture book activity, 3-month-old 
infants already coordinate their attention between the book and their caregiver, and that by 6 
months they jointly communicate affectively about the activity. Similarly, Striano and Bertin 
(2005) claimed that 5-month-olds engage in joint attention after observing that they alternate 
gaze between an object and a partner’s face. However, without any other supporting evidence of 
mutual or shared knowledge, the behavior of gaze alternation alone could be evidence of any of 
the levels: alternating individual attention between the object and the partner’s face, monitoring 
the partner’s attention, or common, mutual, or shared attention. So far, the earliest supporting 
evidence of shared attention with shared knowledge from experimental studies is with 1-year-old 
infants. Starting from at least 14 months of age, infants distinguish what objects they have and 
have not shared communicatively with their partner (Moll et al., 2008; see also Tomasello & 
Haberl, 2003) and use this knowledge both when pointing for others and when interpreting 
others’ pointing gestures (Ganea & Saylor, 2007; Liebal, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; 
Liebal, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010; Saylor & Ganea, 2007). These experimental findings, and 
experimental findings showing that infants point to share interest (Liszkowski et al., 2004), 
together with the many observational findings of spontaneous production of declarative gestures 
beginning between 9-12 months (e.g., Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998), provide strong 
evidence for the shared attention level. As previous studies have not distinguished between 
mutual and shared attention, whether these levels develop simultaneously is an open question for 
future research.  
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In contrast, so far, the earliest experimental evidence of monitoring attention is with 18-
month-old infants. For example, 18-month-olds, but not 14-month-olds, can distinguish which 
objects an experimenter knew about when they observed, from a third-person perspective, the 
experimenter manipulating the objects (Moll & Tomasello, 2007b). At least from 18 months of 
age children also can learn novel words when they overhear an experimenter using them with 
someone else (Akhtar, Jipson, & Callanan, 2001; Floor & Akhtar, 2006). So far there is little if 
any evidence of young children manipulating attention in a third-person context (see Grosse, 
Scott-Phillips, & Tomasello, 2013, for the study that comes the closest to this). It might sound 
surprising that the monitoring and manipulating attention levels may emerge relatively late in 
development, as many studies have found the parallel abilities of following and directing others’ 
attention in younger infants, but almost all of these studies were conducted in a second-person 
context. Thus it is not yet known exactly when the skills to monitor and manipulate others’ 
attention from a third-person perspective (that is, outside of a mutual or shared attention episode 
and without the active contribution of their partner) first emerge in infants.  
Similarly, common attention has not yet been directly investigated in infants – again the 
vast majority of infant studies take place within a second-person context. Several findings 
suggest that adults engage in the common attention level, and that common attention has an 
impact on adults’ experience of the thing they are attending to, their relationship with their 
partner, and their ability to coordinate in social dilemmas (Boothby, Clark, & Bargh, 2014; 
Boothby, Smith, Clark, & Bargh, 2016; Thomas et al., 2014; Wolf et al., 2015). With young 
children, the closest study so far is a coordination study by Grueneisen, Wyman, and Tomasello 
(2015). This study investigated young children’s ability to choose the same of several options as 
a partner without being able to communicate with or see one another. Five-year-old and older 
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children, but not 3-year-olds, successfully chose the same option. To solve the task, each child 
had to attend to the fact that one option was more salient than the others, that the other child was 
likely to perceive the same option as salient too, and to the fact that each knew that they each 
knew this. 
Thus we suggest that infants develop mutual and shared attention before they are able to 
understand others’ attention via observing and inferring it solely from a third-person perspective 
without any direct contact, although the claim that monitoring and common attention might 
develop later needs to be confirmed with future research. Several findings support the idea that 
the second-person relation is the primary relation in which infants develop their earliest social 
attention skills (Moll & Tomasello, 2007a; Peacocke, 2005; Reddy & Morris, 2004; Vygotsky, 
1978). Moll and colleagues have directly contrasted infants’ ability to consider others’ attention 
in a second- vs. a third-person relation (Moll, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007; Moll & Tomasello, 
2007b). They found that although 18-month-olds were able to do this in both situations, 14-
month-olds recognized what their partner was attending to only when they were engaged with 
her in a second-person interaction, not when they were only observing her from a third-person 
perspective. Similarly, even within a second-person relation, infants show improved social 
attention skills in interactions with higher degrees of second-person engagement. For example, 
infants are much more likely to follow gaze shifts after their partner engages in eye contact 
(Farroni, Mansfield, Lai, & Johnson, 2003; Senju & Csibra, 2008) or points for them (Deák et 
al., 2000) compared to only seeing their partner’s gaze shifts or head turn.  
The crucial role of social attention in interactions is especially evident when social 
attention skills are impoverished. Children with autism show both quantitative and qualitative 
differences in many social attention skills compared to typically-developing children (for a 
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review, see Bruinsma, Koegel, & Koegel, 2004). For example, children with autism engage less 
in spontaneous gaze following, although when asked, they can answer correctly which object 
another person is looking at (Leekam, Baron-Cohen, Perrett, Milders, & Brown, 1997). They are 
also less likely than other children to combine their vocalizations and gestures with eye contact 
(e.g., Phillips, Gómez, Baron-Cohen, Laá, & Rivière, 1995; Warreyn, Roeyers, Wetswinkel, & 
Groote, 2006) and engage in shared attention (e.g., Mundy, Sigman, & Kassari, 1990). Based on 
a series of experimental studies, R. P. Hobson (1993, 2005, 2007, 2014) has argued that these 
atypical behaviors are a result of deficits in second-person engagement, specifically, in 
difficulties with experiencing others’ attitudes and emotions directly in interaction and thus 
identifying with one’s partner’s perspective. Further studies are needed to understand what 
children with autism know about others’ attention. Especially useful would be experiments 
investigating their ability to achieve shared knowledge.  
6.1.2. Nonhuman animals  
Again, to be able to engage in social attention, a pre-requisite is to have some 
understanding of others’ attention/perception. Numerous animal species show different reactions 
when others are looking towards vs. away from them, including lizards (Hennig, 1977), snakes 
(Burghardt & Greene, 1988), birds (Ristau, 1991), horses (Proops & McComb, 2009), dogs 
(Virányi, Topál, Gácsi, Miklósi, & Csányi, 2004), and many primates (for a review, see Emery, 
2000). Many species are also able to follow the gaze (or at least head) direction of others, for 
example tortoises (Wilkinson, Mandl, Bugnyar, & Huber, 2010), goats (Kaminski, Riedel, Call, 
& Tomasello, 2005), dolphins (Pack & Herman, 2006), horses (Proops & McComb, 2009), dogs 
(Miklósi, Polgárdi, Topál, & Csányi, 1998), and again, many primates (for a review, see Emery, 
2000). However, the degree to which some of these species understand others as attending to 
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things remains an open question. Experiments testing animals’ ability to follow gaze to locations 
outside their own visual field provide clearer evidence that they have some understanding of 
others as capable of attending to things. For example, it has been shown that ravens (Bugnyar, 
Stowe, & Heinrich, 2004), wolves (Range & Virányi, 2011), dogs (Met, Miklósi, & Lakatos, 
2014), monkeys (Amici, Aureli, Visalberghi, & Call, 2009) and all ape species (Bräuer, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2005) follow gaze behind barriers (see also further experiments on understanding of 
seeing, and knowing, including Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; Flombaum & Santos, 2005; 
Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Kaminski, Pitsch, & Tomasello, 2013; Melis, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2006; Santos, Nissen, & Ferrugia, 2006).  
Whether animals can engage in joint attention is a hotly-debated question. Most 
discussions focus on apes: Several researchers have argued that apes do engage in joint attention 
(e.g., Leavens & Bard, 2011; Leavens & Racine, 2009; Tanner & Byrne, 2010), whereas others 
have argued that they do not (e.g., Carpenter & Call, 2013; Tomasello, 2006). Evidence taken in 
support of the idea that apes can engage in joint attention includes findings that gorillas (Tanner 
& Byrne, 2010) and infant chimpanzees (Bard, Bakeman, Boysen, & Leavens, 2014) alternate 
gaze and gesture in triadic situations. Leavens and colleagues have also claimed that apes point 
declaratively (e.g., Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 2005; Leavens & Racine, 2009). In contrast, other 
studies have found little evidence of joint attention in apes, either when operationalizing joint 
attention as gaze alternations or declarative gestures (e.g., Bard & Vauclair, 1984; Carpenter, 
Tomasello, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995; Rivas, 2005; Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005; Tomonaga 
et al., 2004).  
However, as noted above for human infants, gaze alternation is not in itself diagnostic of 
any of the social attention levels. Furthermore, the few reported ‘declarative’ gestures in apes 
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were either elicited by human caretakers (who told the apes to show them something) or were 
actually other, different types of gestures (e.g., informative, rather than declarative, gestures; 
Carpenter & Call, 2013). Although it is possible that informative and other types of gestures can 
involve joint attention, they need not do so (whereas, in contrast, declarative gestures provide 
convincing evidence of joint attention because their sole purpose is to share attention and interest 
– the sharing is an end in itself rather than a means to some other end; Gómez et al., 1993). More 
experimental research is needed to determine what apes’ motivation is when gesturing, and 
whether, when communicating, they create a shared focus of attention (with shared knowledge) 
or whether instead they engage in a more unidirectional type of communication: manipulating, 
rather than directing or sharing, others’ attention.  
Future studies, along the lines of experiments conducted with human infants (e.g., Moll et 
al., 2008), are also needed to investigate apes’ ability to have mutual and shared knowledge with 
their partners (whether they be conspecifics or humans). Several studies claim that apes have at 
least the prerequisites for an understanding of common ground, that is, that they track the 
knowledge states of other individuals and use them in their communication with them (e.g., 
Bohn, Call, & Tomasello, 2016; Crockford, Wittig, Mundry, & Zuberbühler, 2012; Genty, 
Neumann, & Zuberbühler, 2015). However, as the authors of these studies admit, further work is 
needed to distinguish whether in these studies apes were using individual knowledge about their 
partner’s knowledge (e.g., s/he knows/does not know this – monitoring and manipulating 
attention) or shared knowledge (e.g., we know this together – sharing and directing attention). 
Another useful approach is to conduct experiments in which participants can only 
succeed on the task if they are engaging in a certain attention and knowledge level. This 
approach was used in a study by Duguid and colleagues (Duguid, Wyman, Bullinger, Herfurth-
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Majstorovic, & Tomasello, 2014), and they found that unlike 4-year-old children, who 
spontaneously shared attention communicatively with their partner and thus solved a 
coordination problem, apes did not communicate before their decisions, and therefore were less 
successful.  
Finally, with regard to social attention, it is an open question whether and to what degree 
apes (and other animals) adopt instrumental vs. engaged approaches towards their partner during 
interactions (Buber, 1958; Fuchs, 2012; Reddy, 2018; Schilbach et al., 2013; compare with 
Gómez’s, 2005, distinction between different notions of others as subjects). Answering this 
question would help us to distinguish whether, when animals gesture, they are manipulating 
others’ attention or directing others’ attention to share it. Similarly, answering this question 
would also help us distinguish whether, when animals follow others’ gaze (or track others’ 
attention in other ways), they are monitoring attention or following attention. 
Common attention has not yet been studied in other animals. Future research could adapt 
previous studies investigating what apes know about others’ knowledge (e.g., Hare, Call, 
Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Kaminski et al., 2008) to include the additional step of testing what 
animals know about what others know about what they themselves know. 
6.1.3. Social robots 
Social attention abilities are critical in social robotics as well. Social robots have a 
rudimentary sense of what others can see and can track others’ attention in simplified 
environments (Lemaignan, Garcia, Jacq, & Dillenbourg, 2016). So there is some limited 
evidence for skills of monitoring attention. Robots’ subtle gaze shifts towards objects have been 
shown to influence human participants’ attention to objects even when they were unaware of the 
gaze shifts (Mutlu, Yamaoka, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2009). This finding provides some 
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evidence that robots could be used to manipulate others’ attention. The use of social gaze is 
widely studied in social robotics, as it is a key component in regulating human-robot interactions. 
For example, robots can use direct gaze to initiate a conversation, use gaze aversion to facilitate 
turn-taking, and combine gaze with gestures and speech (for a review, see Admoni & Scassellati, 
2017). Their repertoire can include intentionally communicative behaviors that are designed to 
evoke a feeling of shared attention in their human interaction partners, such as declarative 
pointing and vocalizations (“Look!”; Anzalone et al., 2014). Therefore, the behavioral 
prerequisites, at least, for the shared attention level seem satisfied. A main challenge for the 
development of future social robots is to work on the ability to acquire common, mutual, and 
shared knowledge, to interpret others’ ambiguous verbal or subtle nonverbal cues based on 
common ground in more complex environments, and to track shared experiences and integrate 
them into future interactions with others (for a review, see Yang et al., 2018). Another challenge 
is to identify what types of cues social robots and avatars need to produce in order to create at 
least an illusion of a second-person, engaged relation that humans will react to naturally (see, 
e.g., Anzalone, Boucenna, Ivaldi, & Chetouani, 2015; Breazeal & Scassellati, 2002; Castro-
González, Admoni, & Scassellati, 2016; Lee, Breazeal, & DeSteno, 2017; Leite et al., 2017; 
Salem, Kopp, Wachsmuth, Rohlfing, & Joublin, 2012).  
6.2. Application of this typology to joint goals and other joint mental states  
We focus on attention and knowledge states here; however, the same typology (with the 
same levels of knowledge) can be extended to other mental states that can be either individual or 
joint (such as emotions, goals, desires, and beliefs) as well. Here we briefly sketch how the levels 
could apply to joint goals as an example (since similar definitional and terminological issues as 
in the field of joint attention apply to the field of joint action; Milward & Carpenter, 2018). To 
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achieve an individual goal, one intentionally organizes one’s own behavior to reach that goal. 
For example, while reading the newspaper, Maria finds that she is strongly opposed to a law that 
has recently been passed. She sets for herself the goal of trying to convince the president to veto 
the law. She decides to stand in front of the president’s residence and hold up a sign protesting 
against the controversial law.  
One can also monitor another’s goal, that is, infer someone else’s goal, adopt it as one’s 
own, and intentionally organize one’s behavior to reach it. For example, Maria overhears a 
colleague mentioning holding up a sign in front of the president’s residence. She adopts this 
goal, knowing that her colleague has the same goal.  
In contrast, two or more individuals can have the same goal and know this together. 
Again, we propose that it is useful to distinguish several types of such goals based on the ways in 
which the goals are created: via inference in a third-person context or via direct experience with 
or without communication in a second-person context. Consider this example of a common goal: 
Maria stands in front of the president’s residence with her sign. She sees that there are already 
several other people facing her holding similar signs on the other side of the residence, but she 
cannot go there as the police have blocked the streets. Maria realizes that they have the same 
goal, and that each of them will assume that they have a common goal with her. In a third-person 
situation, individuals can have a common goal by making inferences about the situation and/or 
engaging in recursive reasoning. This can enable them to coordinate their actions towards their 
common goal, even in situations in which no direct contact is possible.  
To illustrate a mutual goal: Maria approaches the president’s residence with her sign, and 
she makes eye contact with the protesters already standing there. They quickly gaze away as they 
need to be vigilant about the police’s action. This mutual contact directly manifests to each of 
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them that they realize that they have a mutual goal to convince the president to veto the law. Two 
individuals can have a mutual goal when they become directly and reciprocally aware, via 
attention contact in a second-person relation but without intentional communication, of their 
same goal.  
Once Maria talks to one of the protesters, “Let’s do this, veto the law!”, and he shouts 
back, “Yes!”, they establish a shared goal. Two individuals can establish a shared goal when 
they are in a second-person relation to each other, while they are engaged in bidirectional 
intentional communication about the goal.  
In contrast to individual and monitored goals, common, mutual, and shared goals can 
give rise to additional, social obligations beyond one’s own individual commitment to achieve 
the goal. In common goals this additional commitment comes from the fact that each of the 
individuals knows about their knowledge of the goal and thus plausible deniability about the goal 
is lower. The personal connection in the mutual goal level makes the commitment to achieve the 
goal feel stronger than in the common goal level, and the public nature of the communication in 
the shared goal level goes beyond this to enable both individuals to acknowledge the shared goal 
and their shared knowledge of it, thus not only highlighting their individual commitment to 
achieve the goal, but also creating interpersonal, joint commitments to each other about the joint 
goal (Siposova et al., 2018). That is, as soon as it turns into any type of joint goal, by definition 
(Gilbert, 1990) there is some joint commitment to it – and the strength of the joint commitment 
lies on a continuum just like with social attention and social knowledge. Joint commitments 
support the achievement of joint goals, as they reduce uncertainty and we put more effort into 
fulfilling joint commitments (Michael & Pacherie, 2015). 
Extending the typology to other mental states such as emotions, goals, desires, and beliefs 
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thus allows us to use consistent terminology across different mental states and start to bridge the 
different literatures on joint attention and joint action. It also accounts for both the observational 
(third person) and the experiential (second person) ways in which we understand and share the 
world with others. 
6.3. Other possible levels 
One final direction for future research and thinking is to consider whether, in addition to 
the levels described above, there might be further levels of social attention and knowledge, for 
example, a cultural or collective level in which we pay attention to the attention not only of our 
immediate social partners but also of the group as a whole. 
7. Conclusion 
We argue here that we will be able to address the question of what joint attention is and 
how the jointness in it is achieved more productively if we distinguish several levels of social 
attention. We offer a systematic framework of social attention and knowledge levels in which we 
distinguish between two types of relations: reasoning about others as an outside observer from a 
third-person perspective versus directly engaging with them within a second-person perspective. 
A key part of our proposal is the claim that we are not jointly attending to something with 
someone until we enter into a second-person relation with that person. This usually involves 
communication (including simple communicative looks) – our shared attention level – but it does 
not always: Neutral, non-communicative eye contact (even accidental eye contact, if it is 
registered) can create a bidirectional connection (in our mutual attention level). This proposal 
contributes to both the psychological and the philosophical literature by suggesting that social 
attention is not a single process, but rather it consists of a cluster of different cognitive skills. 
This proposal also emphasizes the link between the different attention levels and their 
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corresponding knowledge states and points to a need to study them together. We have pointed 
out that not only do the levels themselves lie on a scale of jointness, but there is a continuum of 
jointness within each of the social levels as well. This, as well as the fact that the levels can be 
nested hierarchically within a single episode, illustrates that social attention is far more complex 
than previously thought. These levels allow us to clearly see the gaps in our knowledge about 
social attention in different populations. It is also useful to distinguish these levels because of the 
different consequences they have in terms of what kinds of interactions and obligations they can 
support. First, monitoring attention itself is already an advanced social-cognitive skill, which 
gives advantages to the individuals capable of it, for example in making informed predictions 
about others’ future actions. Second, the common, mutual, and shared levels can support 
obligations and even commitments, each level with varying degrees of strength. Additionally, 
each of these levels presents a distinct way to solve social coordination dilemmas in different 
types of circumstances.  
Social attention is an important topic in many disciplines, ranging from philosophy, to 
developmental, comparative, and social psychology, to psychopathology, to social robotics. To 
be able to compare new findings and exchange knowledge across these diverse disciplines 
effectively, and bridge the literatures on joint attention and joint action, we need to be sure that 
we are talking about the same psychological processes. With this in mind, we propose that 
carefully distinguishing between social attention and knowledge levels helps us to study this 
intriguing topic better.  
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